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ABSTRACT: Abduction is a widely used but deductively invalid type of reasoning. In this paper I will 
develop a tool for the assessment of argumentation based on abduction that can be used to analyse 
and evaluate the type of argumentation as it occurs in institutionalized contexts like science and 
medical diagnosis. I will summarize the most important definitions of abduction and propose an 
argumentative pattern on the basis of a critical examination of two extant dialectical accounts of the 
argument scheme involved. 
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Abduction is a type of reasoning in which the presence of a certain cause is inferred 
from the presence of its effects. The type of reasoning is conventionally valid in 
various institutionalized contexts, e.g. the practice of medical diagnosis and that of 
scientific explanation, but logically invalid because it affirms the consequent. This 
raises the question what norms should be applied when assessing argumentative 
patterns in which abductive reasoning plays a role. In this contribution, I will 
develop a comprehensive tool for the analysis and evaluation of such 
‘argumentation based on abduction’. 
 First, I shall briefly describe the background of the present-day conception of 
abduction, more in particular Peirce’s seminal account of abduction as one of the 
three modes of reasoning, his later formulation of abduction as reasoning from an 
observed fact to its explanation, and the nowadays widely used description of 
abduction as ‘inference to the best explanation’.  
 Then, I shall explain what I mean by ‘argumentation based on abduction’ and 
critically examine two extant dialectical accounts of the argument schemes involved 
in such argumentation. The first of these accounts is the one offered by Walton, 
Reed, and Macagno (2008), in which argumentation based on abduction is analyzed 
in terms of the argument scheme from effect to cause. The second account is the one 
offered by pragma-dialectics, in which argumentation based on abduction is not 
recognized as such, but can be analyzed in terms of a so-called ‘variant’ of the 
argument scheme of causal argumentation. 
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 Finally, I shall propose an argumentative pattern of argumentation based on 
abduction and illustrate how to use the pattern by analyzing an example from the 
field of astronomy. 
 
2. WHAT IS ARGUMENTATION BASED ON ABDUCTION? 
 
Viewed historically, abduction (or a type of reasoning similar to abduction) has been 
described under various labels until Peirce presented a seminal account of 
deduction, induction, and abduction as the three main types of reasoning. Peirce’s 
concept of ‘abduction’ resembles Aristotle’s concept of ‘apagogê,’ Laplace ’s concept 
of ‘reasoning from effect to cause’ as well as Rescher’s concept of ‘retroduction’.1 
 In general, scholars do not agree as to the status of abduction in relation to 
the other two main types of reasoning. According to some, abduction is like 
induction, since both types of reasoning produce conclusions that are plausibly true 
rather than necessarily true. For this reason, they classify abduction as a subtype of 
induction, holding that there are only two main types of reasoning: deduction, 
where the conclusion follows with necessity, and induction, where the conclusion is 
only plausible. 
 Other scholars emphasize the difference between abduction and induction. 
They note that these types of reasoning produce a different type of conclusion, since 
in the case of induction the conclusion is of a general nature, whereas in the case of 
abduction the conclusion is of a particular nature. At the same time they point at a 
commonality between abduction and deduction, namely that one of the two 
premises involved is of a general nature and the other of a particular. 
 These differences and commonalities are reflected in Peirce’s distinction 
between deduction, induction and abduction as the three main types of reasoning. 
Peirce takes as a starting point that these types of reasoning have the form of a 
syllogism consisting of two premises and a conclusion, one of which three elements 
being a general statement and the other two particular statements. By 
systematically changing the order of these elements, it can easily be shown that 
there are exactly three different types of reasoning. Peirce (1974, 2.623) provides 
the following example of ‘abduction’, which is his name for the form of reasoning 
that has a particular and a general statement as its premises and a particular 
statement as its conclusion: 
 
These beans are white 
All the beans from this bag are white 
----------------------------------------------- 
These beans are from this bag 
 
Pierce in a later work describes abduction as a key operation in the process of 
generating a hypothesis that functions as an explanation of certain facts: 
 
                                                        
1 See Aliseda (2006, pp. 28, 38). 
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Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was recognized by logicians 
that the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis – which is just what 
abduction is – was subject to certain conditions. Namely, the hypothesis cannot be 
admitted, even as a hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it would account for the 
facts or some of them. The form of inference, therefore, is this: 
  The surprising fact, C, is observed; 
  But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
  Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. 
Thus, A cannot be abductively inferred, or if you prefer the expression, cannot be 
abductively conjectured until its entire content is already present in the premiss, “If 
A were true, C would be a matter of course.” (Peirce, 1974, 5.189) 
 
As Douven (2011) remarks, abduction as described above should be seen “not so 
much as a process of inventing hypotheses but rather as one of adopting hypotheses, 
where the adoption of the hypothesis is not as being true or verified or confirmed, 
but as being a worthy candidate for further investigation” (pp. 35-36). In 
argumentation theoretical terms, then, Peirce’s description of abduction can be 
reconstructed as containing the standpoint “There is reason to suspect that A is 
true” and the arguments “Fact C is observed” and “If A were true, C would be a 
matter of course”. 
 Apart from the description above, one may also encounter a somewhat 
different description of abductive reasoning. Starting from the idea that abduction 
plays a key role in the process of finding explanations of observed facts, some 
philosophers have argued that abduction does not only involve the process of 
generating hypotheses, but also involves the consecutive process of selecting the 
“best candidate” from the hypotheses that have been generated.2 This has led to a 
tradition in which abduction is described as a form of reasoning that involves the 
process of selection. Within this tradition, abduction is defined as ‘inference to the 
best explanation’.3 
 The main difference between the two definitions of abduction is that where 
the ‘generative’ definition involves reasoning from observed facts to a possible 
explanation of those facts, the ‘selective’ definition involves making a choice 
between a number of possible explanations on the basis of certain criteria: 
 
In textbooks on epistemology or the philosophy of science, one often encounters 
something like the following as a formulation of abduction: 
 
ABD1 Given evidence E and candidate explanations H1, …, Hn of E, infer the truth of 
that Hi which best explains E. 
  
An observation that is frequently made about this rule, and that points to a potential 
problem for it, is that it presupposes the notions of candidate explanation and best 
explanation, neither of which has a straightforward interpretation. While some still 
hope that the former can be spelled out in purely logical, or at least purely formal, 
                                                        
2 Aliseda (2007, p. 267) makes a useful distinction between two processes that are related to 
abduction, namely the process of ‘generation’ and the process of ‘selection’ of explanations. 
3 On the differences between the two definitions to abduction see for instance Campos (2011), 
Minnameier (2004), and Paavola (2006). 
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terms, it is often said that the latter must appeal to the so-called theoretical virtues, 
like simplicity, generality, and coherence with well-established theories; the best 
explanation would then be the hypothesis which, on balance, does best with respect 
to these virtues. (Douven, 2011, pp. 10-11) 
  
The notions of ‘candidate explanation’ and ‘best explanation’ mentioned in the quote 
above can be used in order to reconstruct this second type of abduction in 
argumentation theoretical terms. Abduction defined as ‘inference to the best 
explanation’ involves a standpoint that can be formulated as “Hi is the best 
explanation of E” and an argument that can be formulated as “Of candidate 
explanations H1, …, Hn of E, Hi meets criteria C1, …, Cn best” (the theoretical virtues 
mentioned in the quote being examples of such criteria). 
 In order to get a clearer view on what theoretical tools may be useful in 
constructing an argumentative pattern for the assessment of argumentation based 
on abduction, I will now explore two extant dialectical accounts of such 
argumentation. 
 
3. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TWO EXTANT ACCOUNTS 
 
Argumentation theorists widely use the term ‘argument(ation) scheme’ in order to 
describe various types of defeasible arguments. Every scheme goes with specific 
‘critical questions’ that can be used to assess the type of argument at issue. In the 
case of argumentation based on abduction – which is clearly a type of argument that 
is not deductively valid but takes the form of the fallacy of affirming the consequent 
– Walton, Reed, and Macagno (2008, p. 171) present the following scheme and 
associated critical questions: 
 
Abductive Argumentation Scheme 
 
F is a finding or given set of facts. E is a satisfactory explanation of F. No alternative 





CQ1: How satisfactory is E as an explanation of F, apart from the alternative 
explanations available so far in the dialogue? 
CQ2: How much better an explanation is E than the alternative explanations 
available so far in the dialogue? 
CQ3: How far has the dialogue progressed? If the dialogue is an inquiry, how 
thorough has the investigation of the case been? 
CQ4: Would it be better to continue the dialogue further, instead of drawing a 
conclusion at this point? 
 
Although the scheme and the critical questions presented above are clearly related 
to the ‘selective’ definition of abduction as described in the former section, some 
criticisms can be raised against the way in which this definition has been translated 
into argumentation theoretical terms. First of all, the scheme does not give a clear 
picture of the way in which the premises involved in argumentation based on 
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abduction support the conclusion. All the premises are presented as if they directly 
support the conclusion, whereas the third premise rather seems to support the 
implicit premise that expresses the relationship between the first two premises and 
the conclusion. A similar issue concerns the question as to how exactly the first two 
premises relate to each other. Are they to be interpreted as coordinative arguments? 
Or is the second premise to be interpreted as a subordinative argument supporting 
the relation of the first premise to the conclusion? These questions can only be 
answered by presenting an argumentation structure in which it is made clear in 
what way exactly the premises mentioned in the scheme are related to the other 
premises as well as to the conclusion. 
 Second, it is not always clear how the critical questions relate to the premises 
mentioned in the scheme and how they play a role in the evaluation of the 
argumentation at issue. The first critical question clearly relates to the second 
premise. But since the question requires a gradual statement as an answer, in 
remains unclear in which cases the evaluation will yield a positive result. The 
second critical question clearly relates to the third premise. However, since 
answering the question how much better an explanation E is than the alternative 
explanations implies that E is considered to be the best explanation, the question is 
irrelevant for the evaluation of the argumentation at issue. The third and fourth 
critical questions do not seem to relate to the scheme, but rather to the process of 
inquiry as a whole. These questions are also irrelevant for the evaluation of the 
argumentation at issue, since the third premise contains the qualification ‘given so 
far’ for alternative explanations to be taken into account. 
 An approach in which the structure of argumentation as well as the relation 
between critical questions and the various arguments presented in the scheme are 
treated in a more systematic way is the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. 
Although the theory does not recognize argumentation based on abduction as such, 
the descriptions of such argumentation presented in the previous section can easily 
be translated into pragma-dialectical terms. The translation of the description of 
‘generative’ abduction would have the form of the variant of causal argumentation 
in which the cause is mentioned in the standpoint:4 
 
1 A is true 
1.1 C is observed 
1.1’ A explains (or causes) C 
 
The associated general critical question pertains to the justificatory force of 
argument 1.1 that is expressed in 1.1’ and runs as follows: ‘Does A really explain (or 
cause) C?’ 
 The translation of the description of ‘generative’ abduction would have the 
form of symptomatic argumentation: 
 
                                                        
4 For a summary of the pragma-dialectical account of argument schemes see Hitchcock and 
Wagemans (2011). 
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1 Hi is the best explanation of E 
1.1 Of candidate explanations H1, …, Hn of E, Hi meets criteria C1, …, 
Cn best 
1.1’ Meeting criteria C1, …, Cn best is a sign of being the best 
explanation of E 
 
The critical question associated with this scheme runs as follows: ‘Is meeting 
criteria C1, …, Cn best really a sign of being the best explanation of E?’ 
 The pragma-dialectical account of argumentation based on abduction is more 
systematic, but much less specific than Walton, Reed, and Macagno’s account. In 
order to develop a tool for the assessment of argumentation based on abduction, I 
will combine the two definitions of abduction as well as the two dialectical accounts 
discussed above into an argumentative pattern that can be used for the assessment 
of argumentation based on abduction.5 
 
4. THE PATTERN OF ARGUMENTATION BASED ON ABDUCTION 
 
In order for the reconstruction of argumentation based on abduction to take place in 
a systematic as well as specific way, I propose an argumentative pattern in which 
both descriptions of abduction have their place, arguments are interpreted as 
anticipated answers to critical questions, and subordinative arguments may support 
either the propositional content or the justificatory force of other arguments: 
 
1 It may be hypothesized that Xi 
1.1 It is observed that Y 
1.1’ Of possible explanations X1 – Xn, Xi is the best explanation of Y  
 1.1’.1 Xi meets criteria C1 – Cn with scores S1 – Sn 
 1.1’.1’ Decision rule R applies 
   
Within this pattern both ‘generative’ as ‘selective’ abduction have their place. The 
first one, abduction defined as reasoning from the observation of a fact to its 
explanation, is presented as a combination of a standpoint (1), a main argument 
(1.1) and an argument that expresses the latter’s justificatory force (1.1’). The 
second one, abduction defined as a decision as to which of the candidate 
explanations is the best explanation of an observed fact, is presented as a sub 
standpoint (1.1’) that coincides with the expression of the justificatory force of the 
main argument. The sub standpoint is further supported by argumentation 
concerning the criteria and the scores (1.1’.1) as well as the decision rule involved 
(1.1’.1’). 
 In order to illustrate how this pattern can be used to reconstruct 
argumentation based on abduction as it occurs in the field of science, I will provide 
an analysis of an example described by Douven (2011, p. 7). The example is not 
taken from a concrete debate held by scientists. Rather, it is a stylized description of 
                                                        
5 For a further explanation of the starting points as well as an example of such a combination of 
accounts see Wagemans (2011). 
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a debate among astronomers who selected the most plausible explanation of an 




At the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was discovered that the orbit of 
Uranus, one of the seven planets known at the time, departed from the orbit as 
predicted on the basis of Isaac Newton’s theory of universal gravitation and the 
auxiliary assumption that there were no further planets in the solar system. One 
possible explanation was, of course, that Newton’s theory is false. Given its great 
empirical successes for (then) more than two centuries, that did not appear to be a 
very good explanation. Two astronomers, John Couch Adams and Urbain Leverrier, 
instead suggested (independently of each other but almost simultaneously) that 
there was an eighth, as yet undiscovered planet in the solar system; that, they 
thought, provided the best explanation of Uranus’ deviating orbit. Not much later, 




1 It may be hypothesized that there is an eighth planet in the 
solar system 
1.1 It is observed that Uranus departs from its predicted 
orbit 
1.1’ Of the two explanations considered, the existence of an 
eighth planet in the solar system is the best explanation 
of the observation that Uranus departs from its 
predicted orbit 
1.1’.1 The existence of an eighth planet in the solar 
system explains the observation and does not 
ignore the empirical successes of Newton’s 
theory, while the alternative explanation that 
Newton’s theory is not true explains the 
observation but ignores the empirical successes 
of Newton’s theory 
1.1’.1’ The explanation which does not ignore empirical 
successes of theories is the best 
 
The reconstruction makes clear that both ‘generative’ and ‘selective’ abduction may 
play a role in argumentation based on abduction as it occurs in the field of science. 
The standpoint (1) contains an explanation of the anomalous observation 
mentioned in the main argument (1.1) and reflects the process of generating an 
explanation that is not yet a proven fact, but may turn into a proven fact in the 
future (in this case, the suggestion that there is an eighth planet in the solar system). 
The expression of the justificatory force of the main argument (1.1’) reflects the 
process of selecting the best explanation out of a number of candidates. It functions 
as a sub standpoint that is further supported by argumentation regarding the 
criteria, the scores, as well as the decision rule involved. 
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 The reconstruction also makes clear that the decision rule involved is related 
to certain norms for the acceptance of hypotheses in the context at hand. According 
to Douven, as quoted above, scholars who have written on the subject mostly refer 
to “the so-called theoretical virtues, like simplicity, generality, and coherence with 
well-established theories; the best explanation would then be the hypothesis which, 
on balance, does best with respect to these virtues” (2011, p. 11). In this case, the 
explanation suggesting that there is an eight planet in the solar system is considered 
to be the best explanation because it does not ignore the empirical successes of 
Newton’s theory – a criterion that is related  to the theoretical virtue of coherence 




In this paper I have presented an argumentative pattern of argumentation based on 
abduction. The pattern covers the two general descriptions of abduction found in 
the literature (‘generative’ abduction as well as ‘selective’ abduction) and also 
indicates the systematic place of arguments supporting the process of ‘selective’ 
abduction. The pattern can be used to analyse and evaluate argumentation put 
forward in institutionalized contexts in which abductive reasoning plays an 
important role, like science and medical diagnosis. Further research may result in a 
specification of the criteria and the decision rules involved in the various contexts in 
which arguers support their explanation of observed facts by putting forward 
argumentation based on abduction. 
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